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The Shinto Cases: Religion, Culture, or Both—The 
Japanese Supreme Court and Establishment of 
Religion Jurisprudence 
Frank S. Ravitch* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Japanese “Establishment Clause” law, cases under Article 20 and 
Article 89 of the Japanese Constitution,1 is heavily based on 
situations involving Shinto shrines or Shinto rituals. For a number of 
historical, theological, and cultural reasons, discussed in greater 
detail in Part II, this should not be surprising.2 The history and 
evolution of this area of jurisprudence from the Meiji era to the most 
recent cases creates a fascinating legal and cultural journey. 
There is a tendency to consider the “Shinto cases” as a single line 
of cases that are at the core of Japanese Establishment of Religion 
jurisprudence. This Article suggests that it is certainly correct to 
view these cases as a core of Japanese Establishment of Religion 
jurisprudence, but they are not a “line” of case law. Rather, they 
represent two loosely connected lines of cases and one era that 
involved state establishment. Thus, the cases fall into a history of 
three relatively distinct legal eras. First, the pre-war establishment of 
State Shinto. Second, the post-war Shinto as Culture cases. Third, 
what I will call the post Ehime Tamagushi era,3 or what some might 
call the modern era of Shinto cases. The most recent of these cases 
was decided in early 2012.4 
 
* Professor of Law, Walter H. Stowers Chair in Law and Religion and Director of the 
Kyoto, Japan Summer Program, Michigan State University College of Law. I would like to thank 
Cole Durham, Brett Scharffs, and the BYU Law and Religion Center for sponsoring this 
wonderful symposium and for inviting me to speak on this fascinating topic. I also thank Tasuku 
Matsuo for his excellent presentation and for sharing some of his great experience and wisdom 
with me. Thanks also to Colin Jones and Bunji Sawanoburri, with whom I spoke periodically 
about this Article and whose suggestions helped immensely.  
1. NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 20 & art. 89 (Japan). 
2. See infra Part II. 
3. This refers to the Ehime Tamagushi case, Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1997, 51 
SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 1673 (Japan), and cases decided after that decision. 
4. 66 SAIKOU SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHUU [MINSHU] no. 2 [1st Petty Bench] 2012, 
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Part II of this Article addresses the cultural and legal norms that 
governed Establishment of religion jurisprudence from the Meiji era 
through the turn of the Twenty First Century, and from the Meiji 
Constitution through Articles 20 and 89 of the current Japanese 
Constitution. This part sets forth why there are three distinct eras in 
the law. Part III looks more closely at the cases in the second and 
third eras, those under the post-war (current) Japanese Constitution. 
Part IV makes some observations on the current approach and will 
be followed by a short conclusion. This Article suggests that the 
current approach is a vast improvement over the pre-1997 approach, 
but the current approach also has its limitations. 
II. THE MEIJI CONSTITUTION 
The Meiji Constitution was promulgated by Emperor Meiji in 
1889 (on the Roman Calendar) and was in effect until the end of 
World War II.5 The postwar Constitution was promulgated in 
November 1946 and came into effect in 1947.6 Under the Meiji 
Constitution there was no separation of church and state in any 
modern sense.7 Article 3 of the Meiji Constitution read: “The 
Emperor is sacred and inviolable.”8 
There was, however, a modicum of free exercise of religion under 
the Meiji Constitution.9 Article 28 read: “Japanese subjects shall, 
within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic 
to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief.”10 In 
reality, this clause also included two qualifications that significantly 
limited the free exercise of religion: 1) free exercise of religion is 
available “within limits not prejudicial to peace and order,” and 2) 
free exercise of religion is available so long as it is “not antagonistic 
to [citizens’] duties as subjects.”11 Ultimately, what has come to be 
 
[Herinafter Sunagawa City II] (This case sought the declaration of the illegality of municipal 
property management of property containing a Shinto Shrine.). 
5. DAI NIHON TEIKOKU KENPO [MEIJI KENPO] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan). An English 
translation is available online at http://history.hanover.edu/texts/1889con.html. 
6. NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 20 & art. 89 (Japan). 
7. DAI NIHON TEIKOKU KENPO [MEIJI KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], ch. 1, art. 3 (Japan). 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at ch. 2, art. 28. 
10. Id. 
11. Keiko Yamagishi, Freedom of Religion, Religious Political Participation, and Separation of 
Religion and State: Legal Considerations from Japan, 2008 BYU L. REV. 919, 928. 
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known as “State Shinto” was established as the state religion.12 State 
Shinto involved worship, or public recognition of and fealty to, the 
Emperor and the imperial ancestors who were said to have come 
from an unbroken line descended from the Goddess Amaterasu, the 
Goddess of the sun and universe in Shintoism.13 
It is important not to confuse State Shinto with the longstanding 
tradition of Shintoism and modern Shinto. State Shinto was centered 
on the Emperor and his ancestors, and included public rituals at the 
imperial house and shrines to the emperor’s ancestors in every 
home.14 The imperial household gave items to every household in 
Japan every year from the imperial shrine at Ise.15 It was considered 
to be the duty of every loyal Japanese subject to worship the imperial 
ancestors at home.16 Needless to say, this could not coexist with the 
serious free exercise of other religions. In fact, Buddhism, which had 
sometimes been favored by the state in earlier periods of Japanese 
history,17 became disfavored and State Shinto gained dominance.18 
State Shinto shrines were run by the government.19 
Traditional and modern Shinto, however, are quite different. 
First, traditional Shinto and Buddhism coexisted well for at least one 
thousand years.20 Second, traditional Shinto is heavily focused on 
household ancestors and to some extent broader spirits and 
animism.21 It is not that the imperial ancestors are irrelevant, but 
rather that they are not the primary focus in many Shinto 
traditions.22 
Eventually, State Shinto helped foster a militant mentality and a 
greater sense of Japanese superiority.23 This led to significant 
military action and territorial occupation during the Meiji, Taisho, 
 
12. Id. at 925–28. 
13. NOBUSHIGE HOZUMI, ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND JAPANESE LAW (1912). 
14. Id. at 30–31, 36–47. 
15. Id. at 30. 
16. Id. at 36. 
17. KENJI MATSUO, A HISTORY OF JAPANESE BUDDHISM (2007). 
18. HOZUME, supra note 13, at 91. 
19. See generally id. 
20. MATSUO, supra note 17. 
21. C. SCOTT LITTLETON, UNDERSTANDING SHINTO: ORIGINS, BELIEFS, PRACTICES, FESTIVALS, 
SPIRITS, SACRED PLACES (2011). 
22. Id. 
23. HELEN HARDACRE, SHINTO AND THE STATE, 1868–1988 (1991). 
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and Showa eras.24 Ultimately, it led to Japan’s involvement in World 
War II.25 After the war in 1945, the United States’ occupation 
government officially abolished State Shinto,26 and in 1946 the 
modern Japanese Constitution was promulgated.27 Not surprisingly, 
two major aspects of the new Constitution were: (1) the imposition 
of significant limitations on imperial power and (2) the prohibition 
of government establishment of, or support for, religion, under 
Articles 20 and 89.28 The concepts imposed in this Constitution, 
however, were modeled on the U.S. experience, and as Japan took its 
place as one of the world’s leading constitutional democracies, 
Japanese courts were faced with interpreting these constitutional 
provisions in the context not of State Shinto, but of more traditional 
forms of Shinto with origins going back Millennia before Emperor 
Meiji came to power in the Nineteenth Century.29 
In a line of cases discussed in Part III,30 the Japanese Supreme 
Court held that Shinto has a strong cultural component, and 
therefore a certain level of public recognition. Even a subsidy of 
Shinto was allowed without violating Articles 20 and 89 of the 
Constitution.31 The government actions upheld in these cases were a 
far cry from State Shinto, but these decisions seemed inconsistent 
with the language of Articles 20 and 89.32 Also, as discussed in Part 
III,33 the reasoning from these earlier cases was strongly rejected by 
the Japanese Supreme Court in a landmark 1997 case.34 Since that 
time, the Court has been grappling with its new approach. In two 
cases decided in 2010 and in a follow up opinion to one of those 
cases decided in 2012, the Court seems to have developed a more 
forceful concept of Seiji to Shuukyou no Bunri, or separation of 
church and state. 
 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan). 
28. Id. at art. 20 & art. 89. 
29. LITTLETON, supra note 21. 
30. See infra Part III. 
31. Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi (Tsu City Ground-Breaking Ceremony Case), Saiko Saibansho 
[Sup. Ct.] July 13, 1977, 31 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 533, no. 69 (Japan). 
32. NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 20 & art. 89 (Japan). 
33. See infra Part III. 
34. The Ehime Tamagushi Case, Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1997, 51 SAIKO 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 1673 (Japan). 
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III. CASES UNDER THE CURRENT CONSTITUTION 
This section discusses cases involving the establishment of 
religion—the term for these issues under the United States 
Constitution—under the postwar Japanese Constitution, specifically 
Articles 20 and 89. Article 20 reads: 
1) Freedom of Religion is Guaranteed to all. No religious 
organization shall receive any privileges from the state, nor exercise 
any political authority. 2) No person shall be compelled to take part 
in any religious acts, celebration, right or practice. 3) The State and 
its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other 
religious activity.
35 
Article 89 reads: “No public money or other property shall be 
expended or appropriated for the use, benefit or maintenance of any 
religious institution or association, or for any charitable, educational 
or benevolent enterprises not under the control of public 
authority.”36 
On their faces, these articles seem to provide a strong barrier 
against government support for religion, especially financial and 
educational support. In fact, as the Japanese Supreme Court held in 
1997, such a conclusion is consistent with the language and intent of 
these Articles, which were imposed on Japan but subsequently 
accepted by the Japanese courts and government. Articles 20 and 89 
are clearly aimed at ending state support for State Shinto or any 
other religion.37 Yet until 1997, the Court did not view government 
interaction with traditional Shinto as strictly subject to these 
limitations.38 Subsection A discusses these cases. Subsection B 
focuses on the Japanese Supreme Court’s move away from these 
earlier decisions and toward prohibiting government support for any 
religion, including traditional Shintoism. 
 
 
 
35. NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 20 (Japan). 
36. Id.  at art. 89. 
37. The Ehime Tamagushi Case, Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1997, 51 SAIKO 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 1673 (Japan). 
38. See infra Part III.A. 
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A. Shinto as Culture (and Religion) 
The Tsu City Groundbreaking Ceremony case,39 is the most famous 
of what I will call “the Shinto as culture” cases, and it has been 
followed in other cases.40 It is interesting because the Court adopted 
a test very similar to the test adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman,41 but then held that Shinto can be interpreted as 
a cultural practice, and therefore government recognition of Shinto 
was not problematic under Article 20, paragraph 3 of the Japanese 
Constitution.42 The case also implicated Article 89 of the 
Constitution.43 
In this case, Shinto rites were performed by a Shinto Priest at a 
city-sponsored groundbreaking for a municipal gym.44 The city paid 
for the ceremony and offerings.45 A local citizen brought a case 
under the Japanese Constitution alleging that the ceremony was an 
unconstitutional establishment of religion.46 
The trial court held that the ceremony was a folk custom and 
thus not religion for constitutional purposes.47 The appellate court 
reversed, holding that government support for the ceremony violated 
the principle of separation of church and state.48 The Japanese 
Supreme Court reversed.49 It held the State must be religiously 
neutral,50 but not all state connection with religion is prohibited.51 
 
39. Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi (Tsu City Ground-Breaking Ceremony Case), Saiko Saibansho 
[Sup. Ct.] July 13, 1977, 31 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 533, no. 69 (Japan). 
40. See infra notes 58. 
41. 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (requiring courts to find government action 
unconstitutional if it lacks a secular purpose, has a primary effect that advances or inhibits 
religion, or fosters excessive government entanglement with religion). 
42. Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi (Tsu City Ground-Breaking Ceremony Case), Saiko Saibansho 
[Sup. Ct.] July 13, 1977, 31 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 533, no. 69 (Japan). 
43. See id. (The Court held that Article 89 was not violated because the money paid to the 
Shinto priests to conduct the ceremony was a “fee for services,” and for that reason did not 
violate Article 89). The Court’s reasoning in Tsu City would not likely be followed under the 
post-1997 cases. See infra Part III.B. 
44. Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi (Tsu City Ground-Breaking Ceremony Case), Saiko Saibansho 
[Sup. Ct.] July 13, 1977, 31 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 533, no. 69 (Japan). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
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State connection with religion that, when considering Japanese social 
and cultural conditions and the purpose and effect of the state 
action, exceeds a reasonable standard consonant with the objective 
of religious freedom, is unconstitutional.52 A violation of Article 20, 
paragraph 3 occurs when government conduct has a purpose with 
religious significance or the effect of the government conduct is to 
subsidize, promote, suppress, or interfere with religion.53 
Here, the rites were obviously connected to religion,54 but they 
were not unconstitutional when considering the totality of the 
circumstances because the ceremony had the secular purpose of 
“marking the start of construction by a rite performed in accordance 
with general social custom to pray for a stable foundation for the 
building and accident-free construction work.”55 The effects of the 
ceremony did not subsidize or promote Shinto or suppress or 
interfere with other religions, according to the Court.56 Therefore, 
government support for—and involvement in—the ceremony was 
not a religious activity for the purposes of Article 20.57 
Several subsequent cases followed the Tsu City case’s reasoning 
and application of that reasoning. For example, the Court applied 
Tsu City in a case involving a stone monument on a public school 
playground.58 The local government subsidized the movement of the 
monument, a high profile government official participated in 
ceremonies held at the monument, and the association in charge of 
the monument was not charged for the use of public property.59 The 
memorial stone commemorated the war dead.60 The city transferred 
and rebuilt a war monument on the school playground, which is 
government property.61 It allowed a local association of The Japan 
War-Bereaved Association to maintain the site and use the land free 
 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Saikou Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 21, 1999, Hei 7 (gyo-tsu) no. 148, 1696 HANREI 
HIJOU [HANJI] 96 (Japan) (This case involved a claim for confirmation of invalidity of the 
decision to cease using part of the playground and a claim for suspension of payment for the area 
and memorial service). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
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of charge.62 A Petty Bench of the Japanese Supreme Court upheld 
the transfer, rebuilding, and free use by the association.63 Moreover, 
the Court held that participation of the head of the local board of 
education in Shinto or Buddhist rituals held at the site by the 
association did not violate Article 20 or Article 89.64 
The Court applied reasoning very similar to that in the Tsu City 
case.65 But the fact that the monument was a war memorial and that 
the association was generally focused on the families of war dead are 
important factual distinctions. Also, there is no evidence that the city 
paid for the ceremonies in this case. Still, a high ranking local official 
participated in the ceremonies and the monument sat on public land 
free of charge.66 The Court held that the primary focus of the 
monument and the association was the war dead, which was not 
religious.67 Moreover, applying the test from the Tsu City case, the 
Court held that a monument to the war dead is not related to any 
specific religion and the city had a secular purpose for the land’s use 
where the monument was located.68 
The Court further held, in a tone reflective of the Tsu City case, 
that the head of the school board participated in the memorial 
services “with the exclusive intention of conforming to common 
courtesy for the bereaved families of the war dead.”69 Thus, the 
Lemon style analysis was applied, but a government official’s 
participation in religious ceremonies on government property was 
upheld as being consistent with “common courtesy,” that is, as being 
culturally appropriate.70 As explained in the next section, while the 
current Japanese Supreme Court might agree with the first part of 
this analysis if it could be shown that neither the monument or 
association was religious in nature, the Court would be quite 
unlikely to find the government official’s public participation in the 
religious ceremonies on public property constitutional.71 
 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. See infra Part III.B. 
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B. Shinto as Religion (and Culture) 
In 1997, the Japanese Supreme Court issued an opinion that 
continued to follow and augmented the legal framework set forth in 
the Tsu City case, but which drastically departed from that case’s 
understanding of, and application of, that framework.72 The Ehime 
Tamagushi case involved the use of public funds by government 
officials from Ehime Prefecture.73 The funds were used for offerings 
given by government officials to the Yasakuni Shrine and the 
Gokoku Shrine at ceremonies held by those shrines.74 
The offerings cost relatively small sums of money and consisted 
of twigs from a specific type of tree, the sakiki tree, wrapped with 
folded white papers.75 This sort of offering to a Shinto Shrine is 
called Tamagushi.76 The offerings were paid for with government 
funds and given by representatives of the government at the behest 
of Haruki Shiraishi, the then governor of Ehime Prefecture.77 
The Court in Ehime Tamagushi applied the legal test from the Tsu 
City case,78 but it also added an endorsement of religion analysis 
similar to that used by the U.S. Supreme Court.79 Significantly, the 
Court explicitly condemned Meiji era Free Exercise practices and 
held that, “the Constitution should be interpreted as striving for a 
secular and religiously neutral state by regarding the total separation 
of state and religion as its ideal.”80 The Court held that this 
approach helps protect the freedom of religion.81 This is a stark 
contrast from the analysis in the Tsu City case, because the Court 
suggested total separation of religion and government if the ideal 
and did not give much weight to the cultural and political history of 
officials visiting these shrines.82 
 
72. The Ehime Tamagushi Case, Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1997, 51 SAIKO 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 1673 (Japan). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. HOZUMI, supra note 13, at 59. 
77. The Ehime Tamagushi Case, Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1997, 51 SAIKO 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 1673 (Japan). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Compare Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi (Tsu City Ground-Breaking Ceremony Case), Saiko 
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The Court recognized, however, that total separation between 
church and state is impossible, because anytime government 
regulates social norms it can affect religion indirectly.83 The test to 
determine whether religious neutrality is violated is the purpose and 
effects test used in the Tsu City case,84 but with an endorsement 
gloss: i.e., considering whether the government action under review 
favors religion in the eyes of the public.85 The Court applied this 
analysis to cases under both Article 20 and Article 89, and found 
that paying for and giving the offerings violated both the purpose 
and effect elements of the test and endorsed religion.86 
Applying that test, the Court held that the offering of tamagushi 
(and kumoturyo, another kind of offering made to the Shrines), in 
the name of the local government, directly supports the religious 
activity of the shrine.87 The Court noted that other sorts of gifts, 
such as koden, which is a gift to the family of the war dead, could be 
given on behalf of the government because it is not given to the 
shrine or in support of religious activity.88 The Court also noted that 
government officials may give saisen from their own pockets.89 
Saisen is an anonymous gift given when people visit temples or 
shrines.90 
The Court ordered Shiraishi to repay the government for all the 
expenditures made in support of the offerings because he had 
ordered the other defendants to make the offerings by invoking his 
power under relevant municipal laws.91 The enforcement of the 
holding through a judgment is quite significant. For a variety of 
reasons, well beyond the scope of this Article, the Japanese Supreme 
Court has sometimes found Constitutional violations but been 
relatively lax in enforcement. Thus, an order requiring Shiraishi to  
 
 
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 13, 1977, 31 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 533, no. 69 
(Japan), with The Ehime Tamagushi Case, Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1997, 51 SAIKO 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 1673 (Japan). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
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repay all the costs to the government out of his own pocket is a 
rather significant action by the Court. 
Recently, in two Grand Bench opinions and a Petty Bench 
opinion that addressed enforcement of one of the Grand Bench 
opinions, the Court followed and further elaborated on the analysis 
from the Ehime Tamagushi case.92 The results differed in the two 
Grand Bench cases, but the factual distinctions are significant.93 The 
factual distinctions were especially important because the same local 
government in Hokkaido was involved in both cases.94 
In Sunagawa City I, the city had allowed a joint neighborhood 
association the use of city owned property, located in and near a 
City-owned meeting hall, for a Shinto Shrine without requesting any 
compensation from the association.95 The shrine consisted of a torii 
(gate to a Shinto Shrine), a jishingu (stone monument to the deity 
that is seen as protecting the local area), a hokora (small Shinto 
Shrine), and a sign noting that Shinto Shrine is located in the 
building.96 A religious association called the Ujiko managed the 
property and performed festivals and rituals but paid no 
compensation to the city for the use of the property.97 
The Court using the endorsement analysis from Ehime 
Tamagushi—how this situation would be viewed from the public’s 
perspective—held that the city’s actions violated Article 20 and 
Article 89.98 The fact that the Shrine was originally taken on by the 
city at the request of a local citizen who had donated the land (for 
tax reasons) did not change this analysis.99 The Court acknowledged 
the religious nature of a Shinto Shrine and the problems relating to 
 
92. 64 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] no. 1 [Grand Bench 2010], 
[hereinafter Sunagawa City I]; 64 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] no. 1 (gyo-tsu no. 
334) [Grand Bench 2010] (hereinafter Sunagawa City Failure to Administer Property Case); 
Sunagawa City II, 66 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] no. 2 [1st Petty Bench 2012]. 
93. Compare Sunagawa City I, 64 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] no. 1 
[Grand Bench 2010], and Sunagawa City Failure to Administer Property Case, 64 SAIKO SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] no. 1 (gyo-tsu No. 334) [Grand Bench 2010]. 
94. Compare Sunagawa City I, 64 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] no. 1, and 
Sunagawa City Failure to Administer Property Case, 64 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 
no. 1 (gyo-tsu No. 334). 
95. Sunagawa City I, 64 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] no. 1 [Grand Bench 
2010]. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
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government favoritism toward the Shrine.100 The use of a 
government meeting building to house a religious Shrine, especially 
without any compensation, would be viewed from the public’s 
perspective as favoring religion—in this case, Shintoism.101 
The Court noted, however, that it would be inappropriate to 
require the Mayor to remove the Shrine immediately because it 
would make it very hard for the Ujiko group to carry out its religious 
activities, which would harm the religious freedom of members of 
the group.102 Thus, the Court remanded the case to see whether any 
“rational and realistic alternative means” other than total removal of 
the shrine were possible.103 The Court noted several possible 
alternatives, including a grant, transfer for compensation, or lease at 
fair market value.104 It is unclear if a grant by itself would have been 
constitutional under these facts; but in a related case, decided in 
2010 and discussed next, a grant was allowed under somewhat 
different facts.105 The Sunagawa City I court seemed to favor a 
remedy that involved compensation or a lease at fair market value; 
but since it also mentioned a grant, it is not clear what would be 
required.106 The Court ultimately approved, in Sunagawa City II—
discussed below, a lease at fair market value and some other 
measures.107 
In another decision involving a different Shrine in Sunagawa City 
concerning facts somewhat distinguishable from Sunagawa City I, the 
Court upheld a transfer by the local government to a neighborhood 
association of a Shinto Shrine and the small parcel of land on which 
it sat.108 To avoid confusion, I will refer to this case as the Sunagawa 
Failure to Administer Property Case.109 The transfer of the land and 
shrine was challenged under Article 20, paragraph 3 and under 
 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Sunagawa City Failure to Administer Property Case, 64 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHU [MINSHU] no. 1 (gyo-tsu No. 334) [Grand Bench 2010]. 
106. Sunagawa City I, 64 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] no. 1 [Grand Bench 
2010]. 
107. Id. 
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Article 89.110 Interestingly, the Court noted that given the religious  
nature of a Shinto Shrine, the city might have been viewed—from 
the public’s point of view—to be favoring religion.111 
The case has some interesting similarities to the recent U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in Salazar v. Buono,112 which involved a 
large cross in the middle of the desert that was originally on 
government land but was transferred to a private organization after it 
was found unconstitutional by a lower court.113 The transfer was 
challenged, and the case made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court.114 
Significantly, though, in Salazar, land and cash were given to the 
government by the private entity.115 That land and cash were 
designed to equal the value of the land, given by the government, on 
which the cross sat.116 
In the Sunagawa Failure to Administer Property case, however, 
which was decided before Salazar, compensation was not paid to the 
city.117 The Court noted, however, that the land had originally 
belonged to the predecessor of the same neighborhood association 
and the purpose for which it was given to the city (teacher’s 
apartments) was no longer being served because those apartments 
were no longer there.118 There was no such history in the Salazar 
case, and in fact, Congress’s actions in that case were far more 
suspicious from an Establishment Clause perspective than were the 
actions of Sunagawa City in this case. 
The Sunagawa City land transfer was viewed by the Court as a 
return of land given by the association to the city for a specific 
purpose that was no longer being served.119 The land transfer was a 
constitutional way to avoid problems under Article 20 and Article 89 
that would have existed had the city continued to allow the shrine  
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on its land free of charge.120 Thus, the facts of the case differ in an 
important way from the facts in Sunagwa City I.121 
A Petty Bench of the Japanese Supreme Court decided a follow 
up case to the Sunagawa City I case in 2012.122 I will refer to the 
2012 case as Sunagawa City II. As explained above, the case involved 
a Shinto Shrine on local government property in Sunagawa City in 
Hokkaido. The land was originally private, but was donated to the 
city by the landowner for tax reasons.123 The Supreme Court found 
violations of Article 20, paragraph 1 and Article 89, in Sunagawa City 
I124 but remanded the case to see whether any “rational and realistic 
alternative means” other than total removal of the shrine were 
possible.125 This case was decided based on the City’s actions after 
remand.126 
After the decision in Sunagawa City I, the city and the Shinto 
group agreed to have the shrine materials removed from the public 
building and relocated near the Tori at the group’s expense, which 
would make the shrine much smaller in area and allow the group to 
rent that land from the city at a reasonable cost.127 The Court 
upheld this arrangement.128 Three factors seemed relevant to the 
holding. First, the shrine was there before the land was public, and a 
private entity would now be paying fair rent for its space and would 
no longer be occupying a public building. Second, the purpose and 
effect of the arrangement did not unconstitutionally favor 
religion.129 Third, there was no “endorsement” of religion under 
these circumstances because a member of the public would not 
believe this arrangement promoted Shintoism.130 Thus, the Court 
followed up on its earlier judgment with serious analysis of whether 
the post-remand arrangement was itself constitutional. 
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IV. BENEFITS OF THE CURRENT APPROACH 
The current approach to Article 20, paragraphs 1 and 3, and 
Article 89, is a vast improvement over the pre-1997 approach for 
several reasons. First, the Ehime Tamagushi Court addressed the 
historical reasons for its decision going back to the problems created 
by State Shinto during the Meiji, Taisho, and early Showa eras.131 
Second, the Court addressed the principles that underlay its legal 
analysis in much clearer terms than did the Tsu City Court.132 Third, 
the approach in Ehime Tamagushi and its progeny is far more 
consistent with the actual language of Articles 20 and 89 than were 
the decisions in Tsu City and its progeny.133 Finally, the post-1997 
approach not only states the Constitutional principles and legal tests 
it is applying, but also takes the enforcement of judgments seriously. 
Technically, the idea of binding precedent is not required in 
Japanese law.134 But both the Tsu City and Ehime Tamagushi cases 
were followed by subsequent Courts (and lower courts). Perhaps 
most significantly, the Ehime Tamagushi Court’s rejection of the Tsu 
City Court’s reasoning has been followed by subsequent Courts.135 
Still, none of the decisions subsequent to Ehime Tamagushi have 
been as explicit in their reasoning as that landmark case was. In fact, 
it can be argued that the Sunagawa City I Court’s order on remand, 
that the city should use any “rational and realistic alternative means” 
other than total removal of the shrine if possible, was a way to avoid 
enforcement of its judgement.136 However, the subsequent action by 
the City after that case and discussion of that action by the Court in 
Sunagawa City II, suggest that the Court continues to take the 
reasoning in Ehime Tamagushi seriously. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Rather than viewing the Japanese Supreme Court’s Shinto cases 
as a single line of cases, this Article suggests that the cases fall into 
 
131. The Ehime Tamagushi Case, 51 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] 1673. 
132. Id. 
133. Id.; NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 20 & art. 89 (Japan). 
134. Shigenori Matsui, Constitutional Precedents in Japan: A Comment on the Role of Precedent, 
88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1669 (2011). 
135. See supra Part III.B. 
136. Sunagawa City I, 64 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHU] no. 1 [Grand Bench 
2010]. 
DO NOT DELETE 1/29/2014 9:55 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
520 
two lines. Both of these lines of cases use related legal tests, but the 
application of the legal tests, as well as the guiding principles and 
historical analysis underlying that application, suggest two distinct 
periods in Japanese Supreme Court postwar establishment of 
religion cases. Those cases decided before 1997, and those cases 
decided after the landmark 1997 decision in Ehime Tamagushi.137 
Therefore, this Article suggests that the cases from 1997 until the 
present are far more consistent with the language and history of 
Articles 20 and 89 of the Japanese Constitution. 
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